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Introduction
Mathematicians posited that a “butterfly effect”1 might be
present in complex interactions. Relationships between
Power Transition in Europe, the future of European Union’s
(EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and
protracted Cyprus conflict are examples of this
phenomenon. On the one hand, findings from Power
Transition analysis indicate significant shift in global and
regional hierarchies where the EU is expected to fall behind
its global competitions –namely China, the United States,
and India (Tammen et al, 2000; Yesilada, Efird, and
Noordijk 2006). On the other hand, closer this “rising
threat of China” can be postponed by a deeper degree of
cooperation between the US and US, which includes
economic and security integration (i.e., EU-NATO
partnership in CFSP).
Yet, this desired deepening of
security ties between Transatlantic Allies depends on how
EU-Turkey relations evolve which, in turn, is partially held
hostage by the Cyprus problem. All this represents nothing
short of a big headache for policy makers of Western allies.
Therefore, the implications of a continuation of the status
quo in Cyprus go far beyond what most observers assume
– Greek-Turkish relations. Settling the Cyprus problem
might be desirable in and of itself, but analysis in this
paper demonstrates that the unforeseen consequences of
a failure to solve this problem goes far beyond its borders,
affecting future of the EU in its competition with other
world powers beyond 2050.

Global Power Transition and the Future of EU
Power Transition theory provides insight into rise and
decline of states on global as well as regional hierarchies
and the model utilized lets us estimate the probability of
cooperation and conflict between any two countries in their
respective hierarchies.2 The model utilized is based on
1

The butterfly proposal originally comes from Edward Lorenz’s findings that even the
tiny disturbance by a single butterfly might be enough to alter the patters of weather all
over the world. This phenomenon exemplifies the notion of sensitive dependence on
initial conditions in a dynamic system. In other words, small changes of the original
condition may produce unpredictably large variations in the long term outcome.
2
For further reading on Power Transition see A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, 1st edition.
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler. The War Ledger.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) and Ron Tammen, et al. Power Transitions:
Strategies for the 21st Century, Revised Chinese edition. Chatham: Chatham House (now

Birol A. Yeşilada

4

A.F.K. Organski’s work in world politics. Brian Efird and
Gaspare Genna (2003) extended the theory and argued
that the development of regional integration after a power
transition between two satisfied powers improves because
the formerly less powerful country has a vital interest in
not
only
maintaining
but
also
furthering
and
institutionalizing the arrangements that it believes to have
contributed to its rise.
When examined from a power transition perspective,
competition between the EU, China, India (in 20-30 years),
and the US does not look favorably for the Europeans.
Figure 1 show simulation results for power transition in the
first half of the 21st Century and is an updated analysis of
previous study by Yesilada, Efird, and Noordijk.
The
position of the bubble in this figure represents share of
system productivity for each major power (the Y-axis)
against time (the X-axis). The size of each bubbles as
represents “Productivity per capita” measured in
purchasing power parity.
Figure 1: Forecasting GDP Shares and GDP Per Capita for
Global Competitors: 2000-2050
(The size of the bubble represents per capita productivity
measured in purchasing power parity [ppp])

C.Q. Press, 2004).
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As these results demonstrate, recent enlargement of the
EU is not likely to reverse its decline on global hierarchy
even though the Europeans will maintain significant
advantage over China and India in terms of per capita
productivity. In an attempt to test how Turkey’s potential
membership would affect this picture, the above simulation
is repeated with Turkey included as a EU member in 2020.
Moreover, Croatia is also added to simply reflect expected
membership of this country in 2012 although its economic
impact on EU’s competitiveness is not expected to be
significant. Results are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Forecasting GDP Shares and GDP Per Capita for EU
plus Turkey versus Global Competitors
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In the scenario where Turkey joins the EU, its contribution
becomes apparent by 2040, and the decline in the EU’s
share of global gross domestic product (GDP) levels off at
around 10 percent and begins to show a slow increase.
Implications of these results for integration, future
enlargement, and policy making are clear. Based on these
observations, it is clear that it is in EU’s interest to include
Turkey among its ranks if the European leaders want to
position the Union in a favorable position for future
competitiveness with China, India, and the United States.
Another dimension of Power Transition analysis is how well
the
model
predicts
probability
of
conflict
or
cooperation/integration between two states.3
The
3

Efird (2000, Efird et.al. 2002) argued that the following relationship captures the
dynamics of the possibilities for conflict and cooperation in the international system:

(

)

CI = RP − S RP 3 + H c + H D
Where;
CI = Conflict - Integration
RP = Relative Power
S = Status Quo
Hc = Hierarchy of Challenger
HD = Hierarchy of Defender
Equation represents a dominated hierarchy where satisfaction prevails and a uniform
hierarchy where anarchy prevails. First when relative power is at parity the severity of
conflict is maximized because both sides anticipate an equal probability of success.
Formal work on the median voter theory indicates that this insight is consistent with
rational expectations. Indeed, as Black anticipated, when two candidates with opposing
points of view enter an election they will attempt to reach the median first-- assuring
them of victory. Contested elections are those where the outcome is unclear – i.e. the
last two Presidential elections in the US. Moreover, when parity is approached and policy
differences are fundamental, tempers flare and electoral conflicts escalate to direct
confrontations. The same process takes place in world politics. When nations are
satisfied with international norms (S>0) the cubed RP term shifts the highest propensity
for conflict past the parity point. Thus, greater asymmetry improves the likelihood of
cooperation assuming that the dyad is at least somewhat jointly satisfied, especially
when dyads are highly asymmetric. Further, Organski and Kugler (1980:59) found that
the dissatisfied challenger initiates conflict in the post-transition period pointing to a
cubed RP term. Such results proved again to be consistent with later formal proofs.
Kugler and Zagare (1986), Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Alsharabati (1997)
show game theoretically that the defender does not preempt at preponderance because
it values the status quo and prefers to postpone action. On the other hand, the
dissatisfied challenger is willing to wage war since the highest likelihood of success is
anticipated after the transition point. The relationship between power and satisfaction is
also consistent with expectations. The more dissatisfied the challenger the more likely
that war will occur during a power transition. At the extreme, when nations are
completely dissatisfied (when S=0), the challenger desire to initiate conflict increases
with every improvement in relative power and maximizes just past parity. Thus, the
increasing likelihood of capitalizing on the growing opportunity to redress grievances
imposed by the defender is accelerated by anticipation of changes in relative power.
Conflict can take place under asymmetry – as the Al Qaeda attack indicates – but the
severity of such conflict will be limited. The interactive term allows a differentiation
between the probability of conflict and the severity of such an encounter and allows us
to reconcile some seemingly important discrepancies. The model accounts for the
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simulation results for EU-Turkey relations, shown in Figure
3, indicate no conflict is likely in this dyad. However, the
results also hint at that this relationship will gradually
move from its current integration level to more of a neutral
one in foreseeable future. This is consistent with current
reality. Turkey and the EU already have a customs union
agreement with increasing bilateral trade and investment
between their economies. Therefore, it is highly probable
that integration based on CU will proceed forward but
further deepening of integration (i.e. moving to a Common
Market or Economic and Monetary Union) would not be in
the picture given the nature of worsening relations
between the two parties.

Figure 3: Forecasting
2000-2050

Conflict-Cooperation

for

EU-Turkey,

seeming contradiction that the Seven Weeks’ War between Austria and Prussia occurred
at parity when both nations were satisfied (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). The
equation shows that the probability of conflict under parity is high, thus the conflict, but
the structural constraints imposed by satisfaction kept the severity of that war limited.
Thus, like in elections, two satisfied nations may wage a war of low severity, but under
similar circumstances two dissatisfied nations will wage total war.
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Despite these result and personal desire of some European
leaders to put a wide distance between the EU and Turkey,
this country’s pivotal role in determining the future
competition between global giants remains valid.

Power Transition and CFSP
Whereas the importance of closer economic integration
between the EU and Turkey is obvious from power
transition perspective, implication of Turkish membership
for CFSP and Transatlantic partnership is often overlooked.
Since Cyprus joined the EU, the Cyprus problem became an
added obstacle in achieving an optimum solution for EUNATO partnership.
Of course, prior to Cyprus’s
membership this partnership became hostage of EU-Turkey
membership deliberations – each time an EU member state
raised objections to Turkey’s candidacy or now
membership, Turkey in turn showed its veto power in NATO
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over EU’s access to the Alliance’s integrated infrastructure.
4

Significance of NATO for CFSP
EU’s CFSP is a crucial achievement for regional integration
for it demonstrates to the world that the Union is not a
mere economic enterprise and aims to place Europe as a
global power in every respect of that term. According to
Wolfgand Wessels and Franziska Bopp (2008:1):
The provisions for CFSP and, increasingly also the
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), can be
regarded as the cornerstone of the Lisbon Treaty.
Furthermore, the challenges the Union faces within the
international system are ever growing and requiring an
ever-increasing scope of action across different policy
fields, geographical regions and arenas of policy-making.
This makes the policy field a very relevant, although
sometimes diffusing research area as three types of
foreign interactions intertwine: traditional national
foreign policy, the foreign policy of the EU as prescribed
in the treaty articles on CFSP and CSDP, and the EC
external relations, which concentrate on long-standing
and mostly economic foreign relations and development
policy.

As a result of the Lisbon Treaty, CFSP became embedded
in a whole range of other EU policies that have implications
for external action by member states. Lisbon Treaty
elevated European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to a
Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP, while still
being within CFSP) and made it clear that this change
indicates a greater willingness by member states to
develop a “military arm” of the EU – yet without a greater
4

There are numerous works written about ESDP-Turkey relations within the context of
Atlantic relations as well as regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean/Greater
Middle East. For example see Josef Alt, “The Future of the Euroepan Security and
Defence Policy,” (Maxwell, AL: Research Report Air Command and Staff College, 2006),
Mahmut Aykan “Turkey and European Security and Defence Identity/Policy (ESDI/P): A
Turkish View.” Journal of Contemporary European studies, Vol. Volume 13, Issue 3,
(2005): 335 – 359; Hüseyin Bağcı, “Türkiye ve AGSK: Beklentiler, Endişeler,” [ Turkey and
ESDP] in İdris. Bal, ed., Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası {Turkish Foreign Policy at the
Start of the 21st Century] (Istanbul: Alfa Basım, 2001); Katinka Barysch, “Turkey’s Role in
European Energy Security,” Center for European Security Essyas, (December, 2007);
Atila Eralp, “European Security and Turkey,” Private View, Vol. 9, (Spring 2000); 52-55;
Giovanni Gasparini, ed., Turkey and European Security, (Rome: Istituto Affari
Internazionali for IAI-TESEV Report, 2007); Charles Grant, Europe’s Blurred Boundaries:
Rethinking enlargement and neighborbood policy, (London: Center for European Reform,
2006); Charles Grant, “Turkey offers EU more punch,” Center for European Reform
Commnet and Analysis, (Published by European Voice, September, 1-7, 2005); Kemal
Kirişçi, Turkey;’s foreign policy in turbulent times, Chaillot Paper no. 92 (Paris: Institute
for Security Studies, 2006); and Çınar Özen, “ESDP-NATO Relations: Considerations on
the Future of European Security Architecture,” The Turkish Yearbook of International
Affairs, Vol XXXIII, (2002):231-255.
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push for a more a supranational approach. Reference to
partnership with NATO as the foundation of member
states’ security policy (for those who are members of
NATO) is proof of intergovernmentalist approach to CSDP.
This is apparent in upholding of Article 17 of the Treaty of
the European Union by the Lisbon Treaty (ToL, Art. 28A,
par. 2) reasserting “progressive framing of a common
Union defense policy will lead to a common defense, when
the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides.”
While CFSP remains intergovernmental in nature, some
member states like France see it as a way of setting up EU
as a superpower to balance the power of the United States.
However, many other members like the United Kingdom
see it as a way to improve partnership between the EU and
US in a mutually beneficial cooperation and support in
security affairs. What is clear from recent developments is
that the CFSP sees NATO for being responsible for
territorial defense of active in the latter policy area with its
“soft power” and security related training missions. The EU
has sent peacekeeping missions to several of the world’s
trouble spots. In August 2008, the EU brokered a ceasefire
to end fighting between Georgia and Russia and deployed
EU observers to monitor the situation. It provided
humanitarian aid to people displaced by the fighting and
organized an international donor conference for Georgia.
The EU also has a leading role in the Balkans, where it is
funding assistance projects in seven countries to help them
build stable societies. In Kosovo, the EU deployed a 1,900strong justice and police force in December 2008 to help
ensure law and order. In most, if not all, of these
operations EU relied on assistance of NATO in one way or
another. Thus, the phrase “separable, but not separate”
describes the current partnership between CSDP and
NATO.5 Since the enlargement of NATO and the European
Union in 2004 and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania
to the European Union in 2007, the organizations have 21
member countries in common (See Map 1).
Map 1: EU-NATO Countries

5

For a thorough discussion of this formulation see CDI Military Reform Project of the EU
at http://www.cdi.org/mrp/eu.cfm).
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EU member only
NATO member only
member of both
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:EU_and_NATO.svg

It is not surprising that the current partnership framework
heavily relies on NATO capabilities, more precisely on
U.S.’s heavy lift aircraft and advanced spy satellites, in
advancing CSDP of the Union.
The reliance of CFSP on the U.S. becomes more clear when
one considers future defense expenditures of these Allies.
According to a report by the Financial Times (November
17, 2010:9), EU suffers not only from declining defense
expenditures but also from heavy over duplication of its
members’ defense infrastructure. Figure 4 shows defense
expenditures for EU and US during 2001-2009.

Figure 4: EU-US Defense Expenditures
(€billion, real 2009 prices)
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source: Financial Times (November 17, 2010).

The observed trend is likely to get worse when one
considers planned defense budget cuts among NATO’s
leading EU members: Britain by 8 percent between now
and 2015, Germany will reduce its current €31b defense
budget by €8.3b by 2014, Spain by 7 percent in response
to its current budget deficit (Financial Times, November 17,
2010:9). Moreover, EU members duplicate their defense
industries to such an extent that collective efficiency is
nonexistent. Strong intergovernmental approach to CFSP
and CSDP assures that each member state continues to
maintain national defense industries rather than figuring
out which country should specialize in manufacturing of
which weapons systems. Thus, when compared to the U.S.
the Europeans look pretty inefficient to say the least.
Currently the EU has 21 naval shipyards compared to 3 in
the US; 89 different European weapons programs as
opposed to 27 American systems; Europe has 11 different
tank productions while the U.S. has two (ibid.). This picture
clearly shows that whereas CSDP is the ideal, reality on the
ground is anything but “European.” The bottom line is that
until EU members formulate an integrated and optimized
defense industries, their expenditures in this area will
continue to be inefficient and present an obstacle in
developing costly systems, i.e., heavy lift capability
aircraft, that would reduce Europe’s dependence on
Americans.
EU could significantly bolster its defense capabilities if
Turkey were to become a member of the Union. However,
given all the current problems surrounding this topic, how
could Transatlantic Allies find a compromise position? In
other words, would it be possible or acceptable to bring
Turkey into the ESDP prior to full membership in the EU?
As Ceyhun Doğru (2009: 60) explains:
“With regard to military arm of the EU, Turkey’s
significant input is important due to its military
capabilities and military bases. Turkey has the second
largest army of NATO (after the US) and ranks fifth in
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terms of naval forces. The stability of the region where
Turkey is located is of vital importance to European
security considerations. Moreover, its former and
ongoing contributions to ESDP operations as well as
those of NATO and the UN demonstrate the political will
to take part in internationals peace and security
endeavors. Despite knowing the fact that Turkey would
never enjoy a full-say in the EU concerning ESDP
operations, it endorses those activities to the extent
possible. Turkey is the biggest contributor as a non-EU
country – and even bigger than some EU members – to
ESDP operations and supports further security cooperation in order to assume stability in the region.
Employment of logistic and material capabilities of
Turkey will be in the interest of Europe. Bigger Turkish
contribution could be approved by full implementation of
already existing mechanisms.”

An additional contribution of Turkey’s membership to CSDP
concerns EU’s energy security and regional stability in the
area stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to the
Caspian basin. The latter topic will be covered in more
detail in the following Chapter when benefits and
challenges of membership for Turkey will be analyzed. For
EU’s energy security it can be said that, once more,
Turkey’s location presents a major factor as it is a transit
country for energy networks including the Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline and the Nabucco pipeline. As the Independent
Commission on Turkey (2004: 19) reports:
“The construction of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline [and
future Nabucco pipeline], following the emergence of the
Caspian basin as one of the world’s largest sources of oil
and natural gas highlights Turkey’s role as a key transit
country for energy supplies. Moreover, Turkey’s
geopolitical position and close links with tens of millions
of Turkic people in neighbouring countries could help
secure European access to the enormous wealth of
resources in Central Asia and regions of Siberia, making
Turkey a vital factor for Europe’s security of energy
supplies coming from the Middle East, the Caspian Sea
and Russia. In this context, Turkey’s decisive importance
for the water supply of neighbouring countries in the
Middle East would be of considerable additional value.”

These pipelines represent a policy response to EU’s energy
dependence on Russia and go a long way in diversifying
energy imports of the Union.
The Nabucco project
represents a new gas pipeline connecting the Caspian
region, Middle East and Egypt via Turkey, Bulgaria,
Romania, and Hungary with Austria and further on with the
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Central and Western European gas markets – to reduce
EU’s dependence on Russian oil and gas. The pipeline
length is approximately 3,300 km, starting at the
Georgian/Turkish
and/or
Iranian/Turkish
border
respectively, leading to Baumgarten in Austria. In this
respect it has to be taken into account that a reasonable
amount of the gas volumes, reaching Baumgarten, have to
be further transported through Austria to the Central and
Western European Countries. According to market studies
the pipeline has been designed to transport a maximum
amount of 31 bcm/year. Estimated investment costs,
including financing costs, for a complete new pipeline
system amount to approximately €7.9 billion. The project is
developed by the Nabucco Gas Pipeline International
GmbH. The shareholders of the company are: OMV
(Austria), MOL (Hungary), Transgaz (Romania), Bulgargaz
(Bulgaria), BOTAŞ (Turkey), and RWE (Germany) each
having 16.67 percent of the shares.1 Recently, The United
Arab Emirates' Crescent petroleum, and Austria's OMV and
Hungary's MOL , formed a consortium to pump over 3
billion cubic feet per day of gas from Iraq's Kurdistan
region via the Nabucco pipeline project to supply Europe
(http://www.nabuccopipeline.com/company/shareholders7/table-of-contentshareholder.html).
Turkey’s geopolitics is also important for future success of
EU’s neighborhood policy (ENP) in the Caucasus. Recent
conflict between Georgia and Russia showed how volatile
this region remains.
When one also considers the
stalemate between Armenia and Azerbaijan over NagornoKarabakh, the need for further cooperation between EU,
Russia, and Turkey becomes all the more important.
Regional stability and Turkey’s role in the Caucasus will be
discussed in the next chapter but it is important to note
the policies of the EU in this region that stand to benefit
from Turkey’s full partnership. The ENP aims to bring EU’s
new neighbors closer to the Union through economic and
political cooperation and covers the Mediterranean Basin,
Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. Armenia, Azerbaijan,
and Georgia are included in the program. Furthermore, the
EU maintains a monitoring force in Georgia following this
country’s war with Russia. This has been the fastest
deployment of a mission; the EU has ever done in its
history.
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All of these factors show how smooth functioning of EUNATO partnership is essential for success of CSDP. In that
regard, Turkey’s membership would significantly improve
EU’s policy objectives. First, Turkey will strengthen CSDP
with its considerable military capabilities and improve
partnership with NATO. Second, given the fact that Turkey
serves as an energy corridor for Europe for carrying oil and
natural gas from the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia,
its membership could also strengthen EU’s energy security.
And third, Turkey’s membership will go long way in settling
Greek-Turkish problems – including Cyprus. Yet, despite all
the above mentioned realities full partnership between EUTurkey in defense matters, and thus between CSDP-NATO,
remain unattainable due to interlocking of at least four
issues: (1) Cyprus problem and how Greek Cypriots try to
hold Turkey hostage in this country’s accession talks; (2)
Opposition of some EU member states to Turkey’s
membership in the EU as well as in CSDP; (3) Turkey’s
retaliation to these by asserting its veto over Cyprus’s
participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) and
NATO’s decision-making mechanism; and (4) Turkey’s
demand for EU to deliver its promises to Turkish Cypriots
following their vote for the 2004 Annan Peace Plan. 6 The
6

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called upon the international community to eliminate
economic restrictions and barriers on the Turkish Cypriots and this was echoed by former
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and EU Commissioner Verheugen, British Prime
Minister Tony Blair, and the EU Council of Ministers (prior to enlargement) (International
Crisis Group, 2006:12). Several reasons stood behind this call. First, the international
community felt obligated to compensate the Turkish Cypriots, who despite their positive
vote, would be excluded from the benefits of EU accession. Second, as noted by the
International Crisis Group (ibid) “since the Turkish Cypriot unilateral declaration of
independence in 1983, the international community has adhered to UN Security Council
Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984), which called upon states not to assist the
secession of northern Cyprus. Normalising the economic situation in the north was
viewed as a form of assistance to secession.” As far as Kofi Annan was concerned, the
Turkish Cypriots’ vote for reunification invalidated the political logic of isolation. And
third, lifting the isolation was viewed as a catalyst for reunification as it would initiate
economic development of the north and bridge the gap between the two sides. In the UN
Security Council, Annan’s Cyprus report met Russian opposition and never reached a full
hearing. In the EU, the situation was even more precarious. Prior to the referendum, EU
officials promised to reward the Turkish Cypriots if they voted in favor of the Annan Plan.
Following the Greek Cypriots’ rejection, Enlargement Commissioner Gunter Verhuegen
went even further and presented a scathing criticism of President Papadopoulos for
hijacking the EU process and for wanting to use the EU membership to pressure the
Turkish side to cave in to Greek Cypriot wishes. Similar statements followed from the
president of the European Parliament. In an attempt to reward the Turkish side for its
endorsement of the Annan Plan, the Brussels Commission prepared a policy package
that would have established direct trade between north Cyprus and EU markets and also
provided for 249 million euros in direct aid. Verhuegen argued that “I am making a
serious call on our member states to make a decision to stick to their promises [to the
Turkish Cypriots],” adding that the European Commission had done, and was willing to
do, everything it could to back the Turkish Cypriots (Bahceli, September 14, 2004).
Despite such good will, the efforts of the Commission failed in both tasks as the Council
of Ministers ruled that the plans violated existing EU regulations since north Cyprus could
not be viewed as separate legal territory from member state Cyprus. Therefore, all EU
linkages to the Turkish side of the island would have to go through the official
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challenge for policy makers is how to delink these matters
and overcome the problems.
As a result of these challenges, Turkey is excluded from full
participation in CFSP/CSDP, which in turn, demonstrates its
trump card in EU-NATO partnership. The nature of this
problem, however, is not something that emerged since
Cyprus’s membership in the EU in 2004. The problem
emerged at the time when EU moved to implement “Berlin
Plus” arrangements, which received support from the
United States, that called for NATO to provide equipment
and intelligence for the European-only missions as long as
the former did not undermine the Atlantic alliance by
creating its own bureaucracy and independent capabilities
(Economist, December 9, 2000, p. 56). This was in line with
government of Cyprus – which the Turkish Cypriots object. Despite its good intentions
aimed at rewarding Turkish Cypriots, the EU met legal and administrative obstacles in its
efforts. The initial plan of Verhuegen was to find a formula for providing direct economic
aid and establishing direct trade with the North. The proposed plan would have
permitted tariff free trade between the EU and north Cyprus (for goods wholly or
substantially produced in the north). In order to accomplish this goal, the Commission
argued that the existing problem of “origin certificates,” which the Greek Cypriots
successfully argued in the ECJ decision of 1994, could be overcome by recognizing
certificates issued by the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce since this institution
was established under the 1960 arrangement that created the Republic of Cyprus. The
Commission based its argument behind Article 133 of the EU Treaty that regulates trade
with third parties (territories) and is also used to regulate trade with territories that are
part of an EU member state but are not included in its customs territory, such as Ceuta
and Melilla (Ibid). They had hoped to argue that, in lieu of referendum results and the
Council’s call for ending economic isolation of Turkish Cypriots, north Cyprus presented
such a territory. However, the Greek Cypriots argued that the regulation fell under
Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty (which addressed the particulars of the Cyprus
problem and its linkage to accession). As the Protocol stipulates, partial lifting of the
suspension of the acquis to the north requires unanimity in the Council. The legal office
of the Council supported this interpretation. The outcome of these interpretations has
been devastating to the original intent of the Commission. Gradually, those members of
the EU that wanted to see through the Commission’s goal one by one withdrew their
efforts and accepted the legal impasse. The Luxembourg, UK, and German presidencies
pushed very hard to break Cyprus’s opposition to the plan. In each case, they met Greek
Cypriot veto and decided to separate economic aid package from direct trade/air link
with the north. The Greek Cypriots even won a cheap victory in the aid package by
demanding “the passage of the aid regulation be tied to a more restrictive interpretation
by the Commission of the trade regulation’s likely remit. When a draft of the
Commission’s proposed explanatory text reached the Turkish Cypriots, they declared it
unacceptable, and the process again collapsed, this time with the loss of €120m of the
€259m package thanks to the ending of the 2005 financial year. The aid regulation was
eventually passed on 27 February 2006, with no explanatory declaration attached.” (Ibid:
13). With success in this area, the Greek Cypriots moved diligently to block many other
attempts of Turkish Cypriots with EU institutions that included exclusion of universities of
north Cyprus from participating in the Erasmus program (Turkish Cypriot dailies). In a
similar fashion, an air link between north Cyprus and the rest of the world (except
Turkey) cannot be established as long as international conventions and the UN view
Greek Cypriot government as the legitimate representative of Cyprus. Short of the UN
Security Council’s future resolution that would lift economic isolation of the north, direct
air flights to airports in TRNC cannot be established. Thus, EU countries have been gun
shy in taking steps to establish such air links with the north. The above situation creates
a major embarrassment for the EU as it finds itself in a quandary. On the one hand, it
wants to fulfil its promise to Turkish Cypriots. On the other hand, it finds its hands tied
by legal issues and Greek Cypriot (and probably Greece) veto. In the meantime, the EU
principles of fairness and justice remain unfulfilled as far as Turkish Cypriots and their
supporters in the EU are concerned.
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EU’s deepening of regional integration in matters that fell
outside the typical economic affairs. At that time, Turkey
being left out of the accession talks at the Nice summit,
feared that anything short of being included in the CSDI
decision-making mechanism (even when NATO troops are
not needed) would simply result in Turkey becoming
further distanced from Europe. At the NATO foreign
ministers’ meeting in Brussels on December 14, 2000,
Turkey refused to give the EU, which it is trying to join,
assured access to NATO’s planning skills for missions in
which NATO as a whole is not involved.
The solution to the Turkish veto emerged, known as the
Ankara Agreement, after an extensive British campaign, in
which Turkey received assurances from NATO that the new
EU force would not be used against Turkey’s geographic
and security interests. The new agreement required EU
approval, but before it got to the next stage ran into a
Greek objection at the Seville summit in June 2002. The
matter was settled at the December 2002 summit in
Copenhagen where the EU and NATO agreed to “effective
mutual consultation, equality and due regard for the
decision-making autonomy of the EU and NATO, respect for
the interests of the EU and NATO members states, respect
for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
coherent,
transparent
and
mutually
reinforcing
development of the military capability requirements
common
to
the
two
organizations”
(NATO,
http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/policy.html). Following
this political decision of the leaders, the two sides adopted
the “Berlin Plus” arrangements of March 17, 2003, which
provide the basis for NATO–EU cooperation in crisis
management by allowing EU access to NATO’s collective
assets and capabilities for EU-led operations. These
arrangements allow NATO to support EU-led operations in
which the alliance as a whole might not be involved. The
specifics of the Berlin Plus arrangements include the
following:
1. NATO–EU Security Agreement (covers the exchange
of classified information under reciprocal security
protection rules);
2. Assured EU access to NATO’s planning capabilities
for actual use in the military planning of EU–led crisis
management operations;
3. Presumed availability of NATO capabilities and
common assets, such as communication units and
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headquarters
for
EU-led
crisis
management
operations;
Procedures for release, monitoring, return, and recall
of NATO assets and capabilities;
Terms of reference for NATO’s Deputy SACEUR—who
in principle will be the operation commander of an
EU-led
operation
under
the
“Berlin
Plus”
arrangements (and who is always a European)—and
European command options for NATO;
NATO–EU consultation arrangements in the context
of an EU-led crisis management operation making
use of NATO assets and capabilities;
Incorporation within NATO’s long-established defense
planning system, of the military needs and
capabilities that may be required for EU-led military
operations, thereby ensuring the availability of wellequipped forces trained for either NATO-led or EU-led
operations. (Ibid.)

With the above agreements, the EU–NATO partnership
entered a new chapter of full cooperation that can address
security challenges on the EU’s periphery. However, as
soon as this agreement was reached, new challenges
emerged that would test the partnership. France tried to
negate Berlin Plus in a couple of ways. First, the French
tried to create a separate military headquarters even
though the agreement allowed access to NATO’s command
structure. Second, France initiated an ESDP (CSDP) mission
in Congo that included Canada but did not seek U.S. or
NATO approval. Through this action, the French sought to
negate any notion of NATO’s right of first refusal to such
operations (Anderson 2008: 98-99). This was followed by a
decision between Belgium, France, Germany, and
Luxembourg (known as the Tervuren Four) to seek the
creation of a new EU defense headquarters near Brussels.
Initially, the UK distanced itself from this idea but soon
decided to join in arguing that a growing EU needed such
an institution for coordination purposes.
Other problems in the CSDP–NATO partnership revolved
around duplication of Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) and,
as noted above, Turkey’s refusal to permit participation of
Cyprus and Malta (until recently) in NATO–CSDP meetings
and operations. Turkey’s arguments against closer military
links with the EU rest on a technicality (namely that two
non-NATO EU member-states, Cyprus and Malta, did not
have an agreement with NATO on protecting classified
information). But it was widely understood that Turkey
opposed close NATO links with the EU as a way of
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punishing the Union for having admitted Cyprus while
dragging its feet on Turkey’s membership application and
also degrading Turkey’s role in decision making
mechanism of the WEU (now absorbed into CFSP/CSDP).
At the September 2002 NATO summit in Prague, US
secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld proposed creation of
a NATO RDF composed of 21,000 troops coming mostly
from European members of the organization to defend
against nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. France
insisted on the establishment of a separate European RDF
for two reasons. First was the French determination to
establish a European force that was separate from
participating countries’ NATO commitments. Second, the
European RDF was necessary if it were to involve
participation of non-NATO EU states like Cyprus and Malta,
which are kept out of NATO–ESDP operations by Turkey.
This position of the Turks angered the French, who insist
that EU means the presence of all member states. Yet,
everyone in the EU knew that Europe did not have
sufficient troops to fulfill all its peacekeeping commitments
and its need to access NATO’s strategic and heavy lift
capabilities. Moreover, the EU was already relying on
Turkey’s assistance in some of its operations in the
Balkans: EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Concordia in the
FYROM, and Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Today, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and the United
States, which are members of NATO but not of the EU,
participate in all NATO-EU meetings. So do Austria, Finland,
Ireland, Sweden, and since 2008, Malta, which are
members of the EU and PfP program (NATO, “NATO-EU: A
Strategic
Partnership”
http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm). Cyprus which is not a PfP
member and does not have a security agreement with
NATO on the exchange of classified documents, cannot
participate in official NATO-EU meetings. Participation of
Cyprus is also vetoed by Turkey. Figure 4 shows the
overlapping memberships of EU and non-EU NATO
countries.
Figure 4: Transatlantic and Other Affiliated Countries Overlapping
Defense Commitments
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Source: IISS, European Military Capabilitites, p.3.

The bottom line of all this web of overlapping preferences
is that as long as the Cyprus problem remains and Greek
Cypriots continue to threaten to block Turkey membership
as a means of obtaining concessions from the Turks,
resolution of the above PfP standoff is highly unlikely. For
sure, Cyprus is an insignificant addition to PfP in terms of
military contribution. Moreover, when compared with what
resources countries bring to the table for CSDP-NATO
partnership, Cyprus is nothing more than a midget.
However, this Island presents a valuable real estate for EUNATO security in the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore,
supporters of Cyprus in the EU maintain that this country’s
participation in PfP is a necessary step in thorough
integration of this country in CFSP/CSDP. Turkey, on the
other hand, firmly opposes Cyprus’s accession to PfP and
Greek Cypriot inclusion in NATO’s decision-making process.
This tit-for-tat scenario presents nothing less than a
frustration to other EU members and the US and threatens
to escalate already high tensions between EU and Turkey.

Conclusions and Prospects
Despite complex interwoven interests of competing
parties, all is not lost in finding a way out of the current
stalemate. One way out of this dilemma is to consider an
associate membership for Turkey in CSDP prior to full EU
membership. Of course, this option also carries the risk of
setting precedence in EU-Turkey relations that could be
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used by some member states as the validation of
“privileged partnership” for Turkey. Of all countries in the
EU, and to everyone’s surprise, France has begun talking
to its EU partners about giving associate membership to
Turkey in CSDP. This is quite a turnabout for France but, as
a known skeptic of Turkey’s EU membership, France is
probably the only major EU member state that could
convince other reluctant members to agree. The sensitive
issues would be the delinking of associate membership in
CSDP with privileged partnership and making sure there is
no surprise veto by Cyprus.
Another option is to consider trade offs that could resolve
the stalemate. In exchange to Turkey’s lifting of its veto
over Cyprus’s participation in PfP and EU-NATO decisionmaking mechanism, the Greek Cypriots and their EU
supporters could permit direct economic and political link
between the Union and Turkish Cypriots. Of course, it
could be even better if this also included lifting of objection
to Turkey’s accession by some EU countries.
Unless creative thinking overtakes current mindset in this
EU-NATO-Cyprus-Turkey network, it is highly unlikely that
Transatlantic Alliance would attain its optimum level of
collaboration in a changing world with dramatic
consequences. EU’s periphery is not getting any more
stable.
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